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Abstract
Experimental research on cross-cultural negotiations typically involves subjects
negotiating in a classroom or laboratory setting. Such negotiations are brief, with a
strictly imposed deadline and face-to-face. Further, the negotiations typically involve
dyads from the same country. The comparisons are done on the basis of experiments
replicated in several countries. Internet technologies allow for communication across
the cultural frontiers. While the communication is not as rich as in the case of face-to-
face discussions, it allows subjects to negotiate in an asynchronous mode and at their
own pace. It is also possible to conduct anonymous negotiations for several weeks. This
paper explores the implications of culture on anonymous negotiations conducted via the
Web with the use of INSPIRE, a Web-based negotiation support system. The
negotiations involved 166 subjects from Austria, Ecuador, Finland, and Switzerland. A
model to study cross-cultural negotiations is proposed and assessed based on the
statistical analysis of negotiations.
vAcknowledgments
We would like to thank Brook S. Boyer, Mario Jativa M., Timo Leino, Alfred
Wagenhofer and Pirkko Walden for the participation of their students in the experiments
described here. The project was partially supported with grants from the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada and the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council Canada.
vi
About the Authors
Gregory Kersten was a Senior Research Scholar with the Decision Analysis and Support
(DAS) Project from July 1997-June 1998.  He is now a Professor at the Department of
Decision Sciences and MIS at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada.‘
Rudolf Vetschera was a Research Scholar with the DAS Project from January-
December 1998 and is a Professor at the University of Vienna.
Sabine Köszegi  is an Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna.
1The Effects of Culture in Anonymous Negotiations:
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1. Introduction
Many comparative studies on culture and negotiations have been undertaken, the
majority of which have focussed on comparisons of negotiations conducted within
different cultures or classroom experiments (Graham, 1985; Adler and Graham, 1989;
Graham, Mintu et al., 1994; Roth, 1995). The experiments were brief and the subjects
were exposed to a highly simplified negotiation case. Furthermore, the negotiations
were face-to-face. Although such a setting allows for natural and rich communication it
also introduces a natural bias since the subjects know the culture of their partners. In
contrast, our research uses a Web-based negotiation support system that allows for
anonymous negotiations between members of different cultures.
In the academic year 1997/98 we organized cross-cultural negotiations between students
from four countries and seven universities. The data obtained from these negotiations
has been used to analyze the similarities and differences within and between countries.
There are several differences between our study and other studies including:
• the use of computer and communication technologies to observe the process of
negotiation in a controlled setting,
• negotiations can be conducted anonymously thus the cultural attunement and bias
are reduced,
• timing of offers and other information exchange solely depends on the negotiators,
• negotiators have access to decision and negotiation support tools,
• the negotiation case allows for specification of subjective preferences among issues
and options, and
• negotiations may be conducted over several weeks, with or without an imposed
deadline, that can be extended upon the users request.
21.1 Studies of cross-cultural negotiations
There are four main types of studies of negotiation and culture: questionnaires,
experiments, case studies, and experts’ opinions (Kersten and Noronha, 1999a). The
first type of study involves the analysis of usually a large number of questionnaires
asking people about their perceptions, and reactions to simple situations, values, and
opinions. The best known study has been done by Hofstede and included 116,000
questionnaires focusing on the set of values of IBM employees in 72 countries
(Hofstede, 1989). The second type involves the conduct of the same experiments in
several countries, typically among university students and participants of executive
courses (Adler, Brahm et al., 1992; Graham, Mintu et al., 1994).
Case studies involve the observation and analysis of real-life international negotiations
(Gulliver, 1979; Walker, 1990). The fourth type involves professional negotiators and
diplomats retrospection, information and experiences contained in their own writings
(Fisher, 1980; Cohen, 1991).
Most studies compare negotiations conducted in culture X with those conducted in
culture Y (Graham, Mintu et al., 1994). Thus, very little can be said about international
and cross-cultural negotiations. Exceptions are studies in which the intra-cultural
negotiations are compared with cross-cultural ones. For example, one cross-cultural
experiment involved 30 face-to-face negotiations between Americans and Japanese and
26 between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians (Adler and Graham, 1989). While
experimental studies allow for the analysis and assessment methods used in the process
and attitudes and perceptions of the subjects, this is achieved at a cost of highly stylized
and unrealistic negotiations and their setting.
In face-to-face negotiations subjects know (or assume) their opponents’ culture and may
modify their behavior and try to attune to the perceptions of the counterparts. Numerous
popular articles, handbooks and courses are dedicated to “how to behave and negotiate”
in different cultures. One may be aware of the prescriptions given in these materials and
courses and this also may impact negotiator behavior and negotiation activities.
We try to avoid these problems by using a Web-based negotiation system, INSPIRE.
Communication via INSPIRE is conducted with pre-formatted offers and with free-text
messages (Kersten and Noronha, 1999b). Negotiations undertaken with the use of
INSPIRE allows one to observe what cultural differences emerge, and under which
circumstances. They may also provide information as to whether negotiators
significantly change their behavior when moving from intra- to cross-cultural
negotiations when they are not aware of the culture of their counterpart.
The results presented in this paper not only confirm that “culture influences negotiation
through its effects on communication” (Elgstrom, 1990), but also suggest a broader
scope of these influences. Further, our study confirms findings that while electronic
communication decreases the communication richness, it allows for a much richer
medium than commonly believed (Lee, 1994).
31.2 Previous results
A significant influence of culture on the process and outcome of face-to-face intra- and
inter-cultural negotiations was found in many studies. A study of the bargaining
behavior between children in India, Argentina and the US (Druckman, Benton et al.,
1976) found that Indian bargainers were more competitive than Americans and
Argentineans. An intra-cultural study involved a series of experiments with students
from Israel, Japan, former Yugoslavia, and the US (Roth, Prasnikar et al., 1991). The
results suggest that there are statistically significant cultural differences in the height of
offers, percentage of rejected offers and in inefficient (not Pareto optimal)
compromises.
Graham observed that negotiators change their behavior depending on whether they are
engaged in cross-cultural or intra-cultural negotiations (Graham, 1985). Another study
reported that Americans were more satisfied, Japanese achieved lower profits and
higher interpersonal attraction, French Canadians were more cooperative, and English
Canadians achieved lower profit and spent more time negotiating in cross-cultural rather
than intra-cultural negotiations (Adler and Graham, 1989).
Communication patterns were studied in experiments with Taiwanese and American
subjects and a significant difference between negotiators’ perceptions and actual
interaction patterns was found (Drake, 1995). In some previous studies the focus was on
the perception of negotiation processes rather than on the role of communication
(Graham, 1985; Adler, Brahm et al., 1992; Graham, Mintu et al., 1994). This may be the
result of face-to-face negotiations over highly simplified problems, with strict time
limitation, conducted in a classroom setting where external influence was allowed.
These restrictions impose severe constraints on the subjects and their ability to conduct
negotiations resembling the ones conducted in real-life.
In the next section we propose a model to study cultural differences in both inter- and
intra-cultural negotiations. Twelve hypotheses derived from the model are presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we describe negotiations conducted via the INSPIRE system and
the participants. The analysis of the empirical data is provided in Section 5. Conclusions
and suggestions for further research are presented in Section 6.
2. Framework
According to many studies, the negotiator characteristics, situational constraints and
the negotiation process influence the outcomes of business negotiations (see, for
example, Sayer and Guetzkow, 1965; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Adler and Graham,
1989). Negotiator characteristics and situational constraints are exogenous. Process
measures are endogenous and may be influenced by the first two characteristics. In turn,
all of them may influence the outcomes.
These four constructs are often difficult to categorize and measure. They incorporate
individual, group and social characteristics as well as subjective and objective features.
Outcomes in some cultures may be limited to the compromise and its characteristics, but
they also may include the process and the relationship with the opponent. Therefore, we
propose an extended framework comprising seven rather than four constructs.
42.1 Model overview
The constructs we use to formulate a model to study cross-cultural negotiations are
based on three bipolar characteristics: exogenous vs. endogenous, subjective vs.
objective, and individual vs. group. The constructs are:
1. Culture and other characteristics of the negotiator (exogenous, objective, individual);
2. Situational constraints of the negotiator (exogenous, objective, individual);
3. Negotiator expectations prior to negotiations (endogenous, subjective, individual);
4. Atmosphere during negotiations (endogenous, subjective, group);
5. Negotiation process (endogenous, objective, group);
6. Results of negotiations (endogenous, objective, group); and
7. Negotiator’s assessment of the process, results, opponent and oneself (endogenous,
subjective, individual).
The relationships between the seven constructs are presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Schematic representation for the study of cross-cultural negotiations.
2.2 Culture and other characteristics
Culture is a difficult and an ill-defined concept. According to (Faure, 1993) there are
over 160 definitions of culture. We believe that the continuation of our experiments and
analyses will eventually contribute to a better understanding of culture. At this stage,
however, we are less concerned as to what culture is but in the ability to differentiate
between INSPIRE negotiators. To do so we follow the negotiation literature and equate
culture with the country.
The literature offers different cultural dimensions from which we suggest the following
to be relevant for the analysis of negotiators’ behavior. Graham and Mintu-Wimsat
(1997) offered a similar suggestion.
52.2.1 Individualistic and collectivist cultures
This dimension distinguishes whether or not the common values and believes of the
community emphasize the needs of an individual or the needs of the group (Hofstede,
1980). In collectivist cultures the goals are aligned with those of the in-group (Triandis,
1972); people tend to show more empathy towards members of the in-group (Lituchy,
1997). In individualistic cultures there is an emphasis on personal needs and
independent goals of the group, irrespective of whether they negotiate with in-group or
out-group members (Lituchy, 1997). According to (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, 1991)
Austria, Finland and Switzerland are more individualistic cultures, whereas Ecuador is a
highly collectivist culture.
2.2.2 Power distance
Power distance measures the differences of cultures regarding how people perceive and
deal with authority and power (Hofstede, 1980). One pole of the continuum represents a
high power distance culture characterized by a strong sense of hierarchy and a
preference for differentiated status. Communication across levels is restricted. At the
other end of the continuum, social status differences exist as well, but people are less
receptive to power differences. In negotiations, power and social status is considered
less important (Brett, Adair et al., 1998a).
In high power distance cultures, negotiations may be dominated by discussions on
social norms and standards, as negotiators attempt to determine social status (Graham,
Mintu et al., 1994; Brett, Adair et al., 1998a). Ecuador has a relatively high Power
Distance Index (PDI) whereas Austria has one of the lowest of the cultures examined by
Hofstede (1980); Finland and Switzerland are in-between.
2.2.3 Masculinity-femininity
This dimension reflects the degree to which masculine norms such as achievement,
material orientation etc. or feminine norms like relationship and people orientation,
quality of life etc. are important in a culture (Hofstede 1980; p 205). An alternative label
to this dimension is achievement (for high masculinity) and ‘nurturance’ (for low
masculinity) cultures (Chesebro, 1998). Austria and Switzerland are two of the five
most masculine cultures, whereas Finland is one of the five most feminine cultures.
Ecuador has rather a masculine culture according to Hofstede (1980, 1991).
2.2.4 Context
Hall (1976) distinguishes between high and low context cultures based on the
importance of contextual factors in communication processes. According to him the
content of a message could only be fully understood in the context of its transmission,
i.e. nonverbal aspects of communication, physical environment, social status and power
relationships, roles etc. In high context cultures, information is either in the physical
context or internalized in the person and therefore an explicit coding is often not
necessary, whereas in low context cultures messages are transmitted explicitly and
directly (Ting-Toomey and Gao, 1991).
6According to Hall (1976; p. 91) Germans, Swiss and Scandinavians need a very high
amount of explicit information transmission, i.e. are low-context cultures. Latin-
American countries tend to be high-context cultures (Volkema, 1998).
2.2.5 Time: Monochronicity vs. Polychronicity
The orientation of a culture towards time is linked with the context dimension. High-
context cultures tend to be polychronic, which means that people are involved in many
different activities with different people at the same time (Hall, 1976; p 150).
Additionally, this rather circular time perspective stresses high involvement of people
(which produces a greater degree of context) and completion of transactions rather than
adherence to a predetermined schedule. Contrarily, monochronic cultures with the linear
time perspective prefer the completion of one activity at a time and therefore emphasize
priority setting, schedules, segmentation, and promptness (Mayfield, Mayfield et al.,
1997).
Table 1 summarizes the cultural differences of the four countries.
Table 1.
Selected dimensions of culture for four countries.
Dimension Austria (AT) Switzerland (CH) Finland (FI) Ecuador (EC)
Individualism high (55) high (68) high (63) very low (8)
Power distance very low (11) moderate (34) moderate (33) high (78)
Masculinity high (79) high (70) low (26) high (63)
Context low low low high
Time monochronic monochronic monochronic polychronic
2.3 Situational constraints and expectations
Situational constraints refer to the circumstances of the negotiators and the constraints
imposed on the process. They include the specifics of the negotiation problem,
organization(s) within which the negotiation is conducted, and means and technologies
of communication. The type of negotiations, for example, intra-cultural versus cross-
cultural negotiations is also a situational constraint (Adler and Graham, 1989).
In our experiments these contextual factors were kept constant. All subjects had to deal
with the same bargaining problem, which was administered to them in the same way. At
the outset of each experiment, negotiators were not informed as to whether they were
bargaining with someone from their own country or from a different country, although
they could exchange this information during the bargaining process. Therefore, at least
ex ante, the difference between inter- and cross-cultural negotiations was not noticeable
to them.
72.4 Process and atmosphere
Characteristics of the negotiation process and the atmosphere of negotiations play an
important role in the literature on negotiations.
The concept of ‘atmosphere’ includes variables describing the personal attitudes of the
negotiators during the process. Graham and others (Graham, Mintu et al., 1994; Graham
and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997; Calantone, Graham et al., 1998; Chan, 1998) use the
following concepts:
• Problem solving attitude: this variable indicates whether negotiators view the other
negotiator as a strict opponent and only try to maximize their own utilities, or
consider the negotiation as a way of solving a common problem to the satisfaction of
both sides.
• Attractiveness: this variable describes the personal "chemistry" between the
negotiators.
Both factors can be observed only during the bargaining process. Nevertheless, they are
commonly referred to in the literature as ex ante characteristics and not as process
characteristics.
Process characteristics, on the other hand, involve the timing of offers, the amount of
concessions made and other dynamic issues of negotiations.
2.5 Results and post-negotiation assessments
Much of the literature differentiates between task-related and satisfaction-related
outcome dimensions. In a similar manner, we propose to distinguish the objective
outcomes, i.e., what has been achieved and the subjective evaluation of the negotiation
and the counterpart.
In the proposed model the influence between culture and negotiation results is indirect
(see Figure1). If negotiators from different countries obtain different results, it is not
because they are from different countries but because they have different expectations
and behave differently during negotiations. These differences should be captured by
variables describing the negotiation process or atmosphere. Eventually, this can lead to
different outcomes for negotiators from different cultures.
3. Hypotheses
Following the framework presented in Section 2 we formulate several hypotheses. They
are used to test the relationships between six constructs presented in Figure1 (situational
constraints are not considered as they are assumed constant).
Culture attributes proposed by Hofstede (1989) and Hall (1976) directly relate to
expectations that negotiators hold prior to the bargaining process (Tung, 1988). For
example, expectations regarding outcomes should be related to the degree of
achievement-orientation. It is expected that members of highly masculine cultures have
higher expectations concerning outcome (goal-orientation) and expect a less friendly
8atmosphere (i.e. a less nurturing behavior of the opponent). Additionally, expectations
concerning the atmosphere may be related to individualism and the problem solving
attitude (PSA). According to (Graham, Mintu et al., 1994; Graham and Mintu-Wimsat,
1997), negotiators from highly individualistic cultures expect higher profits, are less
cooperative and the effect of PSA on profit is stronger.
With regard to the power distance dimension (Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997)
suggest that the social status and roles (i.e. buyer or seller) are more important for
members of high power distance cultures. Based on this we formulate the following two
hypothesis.
H1: Expectations of negotiators are dependent on their culture.
H2: The negotiation atmosphere is dependent on the negotiators’ culture.
 Cultural norms and values provide not only schemas for the interpretation of the
situation and behavior of others but also scripts for appropriate social action (Brett,
1998b). We therefore expect different cultural scripts for negotiation processes.
 The time orientation of culture may play an important role in the process (Mayfield,
Mayfield et al., 1997). In monochronic cultures, priority setting and time schedules are
frequently used instruments. For this reason we expect that time constraints of this
experiment will result in more agreements for dyads from monochronic cultures, and
less if at least one of the negotiators is from a polychronic culture. In addition, we
expect members of polychronic cultures to be more long-term- and relationship-oriented
than monochronic cultures (Mayfield, Mayfield et al., 1997). Since they are interested in
the establishment of a relationship they should exchange more and longer messages.
The differences in information exchange during communication between high- and low-
context cultures may also have a direct impact on information sharing and the process
(Brett, 1998b). High-context cultures tend to use indirect information sharing, whereas
low-context cultures tend to use direct information sharing. In Graham’s research
(1985) the Japanese, as a high-context culture, shared much less information directly
(e.g., answers to questions and direct negative reactions) than other negotiators. Instead,
they shared information through the use of a relatively large number of offers and
counteroffers (Brett, 1998b). This leads us to the third hypothesis.
H3: The negotiation process will be dependent on the culture of the negotiators.
In addition to the direct influences of culture on negotiations, our model suggests
several indirect influences. In general, the literature suggests a strong influence of goal-
setting and aspiration levels on negotiation process and outcomes (White and Neale,
1994). Higher goals lead to higher outcomes (Brett, 1996) and produce higher demands,
greater resistance to concession making and prolong negotiation processes (Chan,
1998). Concerning the negotiation atmosphere, Chan (1998) found that negotiators who
set their initial goals at high levels were less conciliatory and less likely to adopt a PSA
strategy.
The expected influence of negotiators’ expectations on the negotiation atmosphere,
process and outcomes are summarized in four hypotheses:
9H4: The negotiation atmosphere will be dependent on the negotiators’ expectations.
 H5: The negotiation process will be dependent on the negotiators’ expectations.
H6: Results of negotiations will be dependent on the negotiators’ expectations.
H7: The negotiator’s ex post assessment will be dependent on the negotiators’
expectations.
Graham and his colleagues examine the role of PSA and attractiveness in both inter- and
intracultural negotiations (Graham, Evenko et al., 1992; Graham, Mintu et al., 1994;
Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone, 1995; Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997; Calantone,
Graham et al., 1998). Their results are inconclusive. Support for the hypothesis that the
level of PSA of one negotiator is inversely related to that negotiator’s profit is found by
(Campell, Graham et al., 1988) for German and U.K negotiators, by (Graham, Mintu et
al., 1994) for Mexican negotiators and by (Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997) for
Spanish negotiators. The antithesis that PSA is positively related to negotiators’ own
results (profits), is found true for American, Korean and Taiwanese negotiators
(Graham, Mintu et al., 1994).
A strong positive relation was found between negotiators’ satisfaction and perception of
partners’ PSA by (Calantone, Graham et al., 1998), but the same hypotheses was not
supported by (Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1997). Taking these contradictions into
account we suggest a positive relationship between both the negotiators PSA and
negotiators profits, and negotiators PSA and partners profits given the integrative rather than
distributive negotiating-setting of our experiment.
 H8: Results of negotiations will be dependent on the atmosphere.
 H9: Negotiators ex post assessment will be dependent on the atmosphere.
Process characteristics measured in our experiment concentrate on time aspects and
exchange of offers and additional messages during the negotiation process. Prior
research on information exchange found that negotiators who share truthful information
about their priorities and preferences reach higher joint outcomes than those who do not
(Pruitt, Carnevale et al. 1983). By honestly discussing their priorities, negotiators can
recognize opportunities for joint gains (O’Connor, 1997). We therefore expect a positive
relationship between both the number and length of messages exchanged and the
outcome. Similarly, we assume, that more information about priorities and preferences
or restrictions of the negotiation partner allows for better understanding of the behavior
of the partner during negotiation and leads to greater satisfaction with results and ones
own performance. Hence, we hypothesize:
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 H10: Results of negotiations will be dependent on the negotiation process.
 H11: Negotiators’ ex post assessment will be dependent on the negotiation process.
Negotiators’ assessment will not only be dependent on expectations, the negotiation
atmosphere and process but also on the results. We therefore add an additional
hypothesis.
H12: Negotiators ex post assessment will be dependent on results.
4. Negotiators and negotiations
4.1 The case
Negotiations are being conducted between representatives of two companies: Itex
Manufacturing, a producer of bicycle parts and Cypress Cycles, a manufacturer of
bicycles. In writing the case an effort has been made to make it as much as possible
‘culture neutral’1, which means that we have tried to exclude any names that are
indicative to a specific culture.
The case describes a negotiation problem that users from almost any country are
familiar with and therefore no additional explanations are necessary. As the users’
language proficiency might be low the case is fairly simple and well structured. In order
to verify the case it was presented to a group of students taking their first ESL course.
The case description fits one and a half pages.
INSPIRE users are asked to negotiate on behalf of the company rather than for
themselves. There are four issues that both sides have to discuss: the price of the
components, delivery times, payment arrangements and terms for the return of defective
parts. The negotiators are not given the issue priorities thus they have to decide if, for
example, the price is more important than the delivery time. They also have to
determine the specific trade-off values between issues.
For each issue there is a given set of options, i.e., issue values. Altogether, there are 180
complete and different potential offers (alternatives) that contain all four issues. All the
issues and their options are given in Figure 2. This figure depicts one of the Web pages
that are used to elicit negotiator’s preferences.
                                                
1
 The Itex-Cypress case was written by Dr. David Cray, School of Business, Carleton
University.
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Figure 2. Issues and options in Cypress-Itex negotiations.
Both parties are presented with their side of the case, told that they are to represent Itex
and Cypress respectively, and that their companies are interested in achieving a
compromise. However, they are also informed that there are other suppliers and buyers
so that a breakdown in negotiations is possible if they cannot reach a good deal. There is
no further specification as to what indicates a good deal.
Each side is given a clear indication as to the desirability of the options (issue values)
but only in terms of the direction and not specific trade-off values. An example of the
indication given for the issue Returns, which describes the return policy of defective
parts, is given in Table 2.
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Table 2.
Options for the Returns issue.
Returns
1.Full price on all returned parts.
2.Five percent spoilage allowed. If more than five percent of a shipment is
unacceptable the whole shipment is returned for a 75% refund.
3.Ten percent spoilage allowed. If more than 10% of a shipment is
unacceptable the whole shipment is returned for a 75% refund.
Number 1 is the most preferred and number 3 the least preferred by Cypress.
By avoiding the specification of preference values negotiators are able to establish their
own priorities within each issue. Furthermore, the negotiators’ partial utilities (part-
worths) may be linear as well as non-linear. In Figure 2, the non-linear case is indicated
with respect to Price and Delivery; user’s preferences are identical for the price of $4.37
and $4.12.
There is no mechanism enforcing the preference direction and therefore some
negotiators did not follow the preference direction literally. Rather, they assigned the
maximum partial utility to one of the intermediate and not extreme options. For
example, a Cypress representative might have assigned a higher partial utility to the
second option of the Return issue than to the first option.
4.2 Negotiations via INSPIRE
Graham, Mintu et al. (1994) suggest that three phases be considered when studying
business negotiations: an antecedent phase, a concurrent phase, and a consequent
phase. These three phases roughly correspond to three phases of the negotiation via the
INSPIRE system: analysis, conduct of negotiation, and post-settlement (Kersten and
Noronha, 1999b).
4.2.1 Analysis phase
The pre-negotiation phase involves an analysis of the situation, problem and opponent,
formulation of preferences, reservation levels, BATNA, and strategy. Data on the
negotiation problem, negotiators’ characteristics, including their preferences, and
situational constraints are considered within this phase (Rubin and Brown, 1975). In the
INSPIRE negotiation two main instruments are used to collect the data:
1. forms used to elicit preferences and construct a negotiator’s utility function, and
2. a pre-negotiation questionnaire which every negotiator has to fill in after her/his
utility function has been constructed and before the negotiation can begin.
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4.2.2 Conduct of negotiations
The negotiation phase involves exchanges of messages and offers. Offers comprise the
negotiated issues and their values, e.g., one of the three values of the returns policy
given in Table 2. The negotiation is parallel on all issues. Participants may submit the
same offer many times, or keep the option of an issue unchanged, but each submitted
offer contains a value for each issue.
The negotiation ends when a compromise has been achieved, one of the parties
terminates the process, or at a predetermined deadline. The concurrent research phase
corresponds to the conduct of the negotiation and it comprises process-related variables,
such as the strategy and behavior used by negotiators (Graham, 1985), changes in the
negotiation problem and negotiators’ perceptions, and the dynamics of negotiations
(Kersten, 1985; Graham, Mintu et al., 1994).
4.2.3 Post-settlement
The post-settlement analysis phase may be static and involve only the evaluation of the
negotiation outcomes generated by, and after, the negotiation activity (Tung, 1988).
These outcomes include the information about the compromise and the negotiators’
satisfaction. The analysis thus focuses on the evaluation of variables describing
outcomes. Furthermore, INSPIRE users have the possibility to improve inefficient
compromises.
The post-settlement phase ends with filling in the post-negotiation questionnaire which,
however, is not mandatory. A user may log out from the system or--upon filling in the
questionnaire--is directed to multiple negotiation resources, handouts, systems which
are available on the InterNeg site, but about which users are not informed during
negotiation.
4.3 Participants
For the present study 166 participants were recruited from classes held at seven
participating universities for the total of 83 dyads. The distribution of participants is
given in Table 3. To achieve comparability and disallow for communication other than
electronic, intra-cultural negotiations were conducted by subjects from different
universities in the same country. Because in Ecuador and Switzerland students from
only one university participated in the experiment, intra-cultural negotiations were
conducted only by Austrians and Finns.
Table 3.
Negotiating dyads.
Austria (AT) Switzerland (CH) Finland (FI) Ecuador (EC)
Austria (AT) 9 -- -- --
Switzerland (CH) 14 -- -- --
Finland (FI) 13 14 13 --
Ecuador (EC) 4 -- 16 --
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All participants from Ecuador and Finland were also born in these countries, for the
Austrian participants the corresponding rate was 95%. The only large difference
between country of birth and country of residence showed up among Swiss subjects, but
even there the rate of native subjects was well over 60% (16 out of 25). A similar
homogeneity could be observed with respect to native languages. 90% of the
participants from Austria and Ecuador and over 80% of the participants from Finland
can be considered as homogenous. Swiss participants are about evenly divided into
German-speaking and French-speaking. Therefore, in this study the country of residence
is considered an adequate indicator of culture.
The participants did not receive any financial reward. They used INSPIRE as a course
assignment, however, the assignments were not evaluated on the basis of their
performance. Students knew that experimenters did not inform instructors about the
compromise or the score the participants achieved.
4.4 Variables
Complete INSPIRE negotiations are automatically recorded and each activity is time-
stamped. The retrieval of data, however, requires a significant amount of programming
and at present only 35 variables are retrieved and used in this study. The list of variables
and their short descriptions are given in Table 4.
The composite representation of the model depicted in Figure 2, together with the list of
variables describing each category and hypotheses, is presented in Figure 3.
In addition to the variables listed in Table 4, two additional variables, OPPPSA and
OWNPSA, are introduced in Figure 3, describing respectively the opponent’s and the
negotiator‘s problem solving attitude. These are composite variables and their values are
computed using variables OPPCOOP, OPPEXPLO, OPPHONES, OPPINFOR and
OPPPERSU using factor analysis further described in Section 5.1.2.
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Table 4.
Description of variables.
Category Variable Explanation Type, Value
Culture CRESIDE Negotiator’s Residence
OPRESIDE Opponent’s Residence
Expectations ESCORE Expected compromise 1 Derived, Real
RSCORE Reservation levels 1 Derived, Real
EFRNDLY Expected process friendliness 5-point scale
Atmosphere OPPCOOP Opponent found cooperative 5-point scale
OPPEXPLO Opponent found exploitative 5-point scale
OPPHONES Opponent found honest 5-point scale
OPPINFOR Opponent found informative 5-point scale
OPPPERSU Opponent found persuasive 5-point scale
FRNDLY Friendliness of the negotiator’s opponent 5-point scale
SEEOPP Interested to meet the opponent Yes/No
WORKWOPP Interested to work with the opponent Yes/No
DISCLC Disclosure of partners’ country Yes/No
DISCLID Disclosure of partners’ identity Yes/No
Process OFR Number of offers Integer
OFRWMSG Number of offers with messages Integer
MSG Number of messages Integer
NEGO_LEN Length of negotiation Integer
MNOFR_LN Mean time between offers Integer
MNMSG_LN Length of messages Integer
LATE_4 No. of offers made 4 days before deadline Integer
LATE_2 No. of offers made 2 days before deadline Integer
LATE_1 No. of offers made 1 day before deadline Integer
TIME_DS Time between the end of negotiation and deadline Real
AGR Agreement reached Yes/No
Results SCORE Compromise utility Real
OPT Agreement’s efficiency (Pareto-optimality) Yes/No
RELTOEXP Ratio of achieved to expected utility Real
AGR Phase when agreement reached (0-no agreement) Integer
Assessment AGRSAT Satisfaction with agreement 7-point scale
CONTROL Perceived level of control 7-point scale
SETTLEME Acceptance of the settlement in real-life situation Yes/No
METE Negotiation met expectations 7-point scale
PERF Satisfaction with own performance 7-point scale
1
 Subjects formulated the expected compromise and the reservation levels in terms of issues. After the
utility functions were computed, the utility values of these two alternatives were obtained.
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Process:
• OFR
• OFRWMSG
• MSG
• NEGO_LEN
• MNOFR_LN
• MNMSG_LN
• LATE_1
• LATE_2
• LATE_4
• TIME_DS
• AGR *
Atmosphere:
Problem solving attitude
• OPPCOOP
• OPPEXPLO
• OPPHONES
• OPPINFOR
• OPPPERSU
• OPPPSA
• OWNPSA
 Opponent attractiveness
• FRNDLY
• SEEOPP
• DISCLC *
• DISCLID *
• WORKWOPP *
Results:
• SCORE
• RELTOEXP
• OPT *
• AGR *
Assessment:
• AGRSAT
• SETTLEME
• CONTROL
• METE
• PERF
H 1
H 2
H 4
H 10
H 3
H 7
H 12H 11
H 6
H 5
H 9
H 8
Expectations:
• ESCORE
• RSCORE
• EFRNDLY
Culture:
• CRESIDE
• OPRESIDE
Figure 3. Negotiation model, variables and hypotheses.
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5. Analysis
In the following sections separately we review results for each hypothesis (H1 – H12)
formulated in Section 3. The main focus is on the direct impact of culture, but other
factors are also considered to show how culture may have an indirect influence on other
variables.
5.1  Direct implications of culture
5.1.1 Influence of culture on expectations (H1)
Our results indicate a strong influence of culture on negotiators’ expectations. Table 5
shows the average utility values of the compromises that the negotiators expected to
achieve.
The expected compromise (ESCORE) yielding high utility is indicative of orientation on
direct results of negotiations. This is typical for masculine orientation. However,
although both Austria and Switzerland have a higher masculinity index than Ecuador
(see Table 1), Ecuadorians had significantly higher expectations than the negotiators
from other countries. The ANOVA test indicates that culture has a significant effect on
the utility value of the expected compromise at the 0,05 level.
Table 5.
Negotiators expectations (ESCORE, EFRNDLY).
Expected score of a compromise Expected friendliness of negotiations
Country Case Mean SD Country Case Mean SD
AT Cypress 64.86 23.74 AT Cypress 2.50 0.75
AT Itex 62.78 8.89 Itex 2.56 0.73
CH Itex 67.20 17.98 CH Itex 2.64 0.79
EC Itex 87.40 11.68 EC Itex 1.95 0.69
FI Cypress 67.77 17.18 FI Cypress 2.26 0.88
FI Itex 71.95 15.75 Itex 2.55 0.83
Ecuador has an extreme position compared to the other three countries on the
dimensions of power distance and individualism (see Table 1). The very strong
collectivist attitude of Ecuadorians could be an explanation for their different
expectations concerning the friendliness of negotiations. Subjects' expectations
regarding friendliness of negotiations (EFRNDLY) are culturally motivated with the
significance level of 0,017.
No significant difference could be found for the utility values of alternatives defined by
reservation levels (RSCORE).
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5.1.2 Influence of culture on the atmosphere (H2)
Following Calantone, Graham et al. (1998) we use factor analysis to compare the
problem solving attitude (PSA) defined by five variables: cooperation, exploitation,
honesty, informativeness and persuasiveness. The factor loadings obtained for the first
two principal factors (F1 and F2) are listed in Table 6.
Table 6.
Factor loadings (PSA).
Opponent F1 F2
Cooperative (OPPCOOP) 0.34482 -0.23239
Exploitative (OPPEXPLO) - 0.10318 0.84860
Honest (OPPHONES) 0.34733 0.00204
Informative (OPPINFOR) 0.30366 0.29680
Persuasive (OPPPERSU) 0.27938 0.27509
The first factor appears to be a good representation of the PSA. Opponents considered
to be exploitative have the opposite sign as the other variables, because this
characteristic describes a negative attitude. Persuasiveness may be interpreted in both
directions. It is positively correlated with the other characteristics, indicating perhaps
that an opponent with positive characteristics is also more persuasive than one with
negative characteristics.
Interpretation of the second factor is more difficult. Given the orthogonality property of
factor analysis, it encompasses effects not explained by the first factor. It should be
noted that factor loadings for this factor are particularly high for the question describing
a negative characteristic of the opponent. An opponent with a high score on the second
factor could probably be described as a "tough" negotiator. Toughness in that sense
would not be a contradiction to problem orientation, but rather an independent,
orthogonal dimension.
Factor loadings are very close for the individual countries, as shown in Table 7. This
result confirms recent results obtained by Calantone, Graham et al. (1998) for face-to-
face negotiations. They found that culture has little influence on negotiators’ PSA. It
should be noted that, due to the scaling of variables used in the questionnaire, high
values imply a low degree of problem solving attitude.
As could be expected in view of these results no significant influence of culture was
detected in the analysis of variance on the PSA score, nor on its individual components.
In contrast, two effects of culture on negotiator attractiveness were found to be
significant, namely friendliness of negotiations (FRNDLY) and the willingness to see
the opponent (SEEOPP).
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Table 7.
Factor loadings for individual countries (PSA).
Variable AT CH EC FI
F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2
OPPCOOP 0.39312 -0.18813  0.28228 -0.26854  0.23152 -0.59366 0.39569 -0.15993
OPPEXPLO -0.13855  0.68184 -0.26954  0.34359 -0.24585  0.40234 -0.13042 0.88752
OPPHONES 0.35499 -0.05708  0.25653 -0.25983  0.25480  0.35253 0.40400 0.17963
OPPINFOR 0.29115  0.43655  0.25762  0.41467  0.21924  0.67909 0.28307 0.36905
OPPPERSU 0.23963  0.25703  0.18578  0.69028  0.30301 -0.00775 0.25300 0.00787
The variable FRNDLY significantly depends on the opponent’s country of residence.
Having an opponent from Ecuador makes for a less friendly atmosphere than from
another country at the significance level of 0.1 (Table 8).
Table 8.
Perceived friendliness of negotiations (FRNDLY*)
Country of opponent Mean SD
AT 2.81 1.39
CH 2.54 1.39
EC 3.20 1.01
FI 2.49 1.38
* 1 = Completely, 7 = Not at all
The willingness to see one’s opponent was significantly influenced (at the level of
0.068) by the interaction term between the two countries of negotiators (Table 9).
However, interestingly enough, both the highest (3.25 FI-FI) and lowest (1.33 AT-AT)
values occur in intra-cultural negotiations in countries that are similar on the
individualism-collectivism dimension (see Table 1).
20
Table 9.
Willingness to see opponent (SEEOPP*)
Opponent’s countryOwn Country
AT CH EC FI
AT Mean 1.33 2.88 2.50 2.25
Std. 0.82 1.89 1.91 1.49
CH Mean 2.50 . . 1.71
Std. 1.38 1.11
EC Mean 1.75 . . 1.94
Std. 0.50 0.93
FI Mean 3.00 2.40 2.18 3.25
Std. 1.05 1.34 0.87 1.06
* 1 = Extremely interested, 5 = Not at all interested.
5.1.3 Influence of culture on the process (H3)
Several effects of culture on the communication behavior and on the time dimension of
the process were found to be significant. The mean number of offers accompanied by
messages for each country is presented in Table 10. While there are no significant
differences in the number of offers or the number of messages exchanged, significant
differences were observed in the number of offers accompanied by messages and the
total length of messages.
Table 10
Number of offers accompanied by messages (OFRWMSG).
Country Mean Std. Deviation
AT 3.43 1.64
CH 3.91 1.87
EC 4.70 1.34
FI 3.90 1.81
The number of offers accompanied by messages was higher for Ecuadorians. This
difference, however, was significant only at the 15% level.
Differences also occurred in the size of messages. In contrast to the number of
messages, the size also strongly depended on the composition of the dyad, and not only
on the country of the negotiator sending the message. In Table 11 the corresponding
results are presented.
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Table 11
Length of messages (MNMSG_LN).
Opponent’s countryCountry of
Residence AT CH EC FI
AT MEAN 355.17 445.00 807.00 607.71
STD 254.80 200.69 476.59 690.36
CH MEAN 726.86 . . 878.25
STD 395.96 . . 631.56
EC MEAN 972.33 . . 529.77
STD 1146.15 . . 423.37
FI MEAN 558.71 1166.00 472.73 246.64
STD 594.17 1358.34 236.52 142.66
The average length of a message sent by the Finns to the Swiss was more than four
times the length of messages sent to fellow Finns. It is interesting to see that the two
lowest values occur in intra-cultural negotiations. This effect was significant at the 8%
level.
Intra-cultural negotiations exhibited significantly more interactions during the last days
of negotiation than inter-cultural negotiations (at the 3.7% and 5% significance levels).
Table 12 shows the fraction of offers made on the last day (LATE_1) and the last 2 days
(LATE_2) for the various types of dyads. Again, intra-cultural negotiations are different
from inter-cultural negotiations by exhibiting a much higher level of activity during the
last days.
Table 12
Fraction of offers exchanged during last day (LATE_1) and 2 days (LATE_2).
Opponent’s country
AT CH EC FI
Country LATE_1 LATE_2 LATE_1 LATE_2 LATE_1 LATE_2 LATE_1 LATE_2
AT MEAN  0.083  0.083  0.017  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
STD
 0.142  0.142  0.053  0.053  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
CH MEAN  0.013  0.013      .      .      .      .  0.015  0.015
STD
 0.043  0.043      .      .      .      .  0.050  0.050
EC MEAN  0.000  0.000      .      .      .      .  0.000  0.000
STD
 0.000  0.000      .      .      .      .  0.000  0.000
FI MEAN  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.018  0.000  0.013  0.034  0.045
STD
 0.000  0.000  0.060  0.060  0.000  0.050  0.095  0.114
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5.2 Direct implications of expectations
5.2.1 Effects of expectations on the atmosphere (H4)
No significant effects were found at the 5% level.
5.2.2 Effects of expectations on the process (H5)
Expectations had a fairly strong effect on process characteristics. The results of a
regression analysis between communication structure and expectation variables are
given in Table 13. In this and the following tables the numbers in bold indicate results
that are significant at the 5% or lower levels and the italicized numbers – results
significant at the level between 5% and 10%
Table 13
Influence of expectations on communication behavior.
Dependent
variable
Statistic Intercept Expected
Score
(ESCORE)
Reservation
score
(RSCORE)
Expected
friendliness
(EFRNDLY)
Offers Parameter   3.2496
  0.02196 -0.00892 -0.06634
(OFR) t-value   4.12
  2.52 -1.41 -0.35
p >|t| 0.0001 0.0129 0.1614 0.7239
Offers with Parameter  3.2913
 0.01808 -0.00580 0.17034
messages t-value   4.33
  2.15 -0.95 -0.94
(OFRWMSG) p >|t| 0.0001 0.0331 0.3440 0.3472
Messages Parameter   1.2498   0.00675 -0.00767 -0.07667
(MSG) t-value   2.18   1.07 -1.67 -0.56
p >|t| 0.0306 0.2875 0.0973 0.5736
A consistent pattern emerges. Subjects with a higher expected utility value tend to
communicate more intensively. On the other hand, a higher utility value of the
reservation levels reduces communication activities, although not as significantly.
Expectations concerning friendliness do not significantly influence communication
patterns
5.2.3 Effects of expectations on results (H6)
At the individual level, expectations had a strong influence on outcomes. The summary
of the results of regressions of utility values achieved on the expectation variables is
given in Table 14.
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Table 14
Regression analysis for the compromise utility value (SCORE).
Dependent
variable
Statistic Intercept Expected
Score
(ESCORE)
Reservation
score
(RSCORE)
Expected
friendliness
(EFRNDLY)
Score Parameter 31.4668 0.40325 0.07980 1.08188
(SCORE) t-value 3.48 3.94 1.17 0.53
p > |t| 0.0007 0.0001 0.2458 0.5998
The utility value of the expected compromise (SCORE) had a strong positive impact on
the utility value of the negotiated settlement. To test whether expectations are actually a
transmission mechanism by which culture influences outcomes, or whether both
expected and actual utility values are influenced by some other variable, the same
regression was performed within the groups of subjects from different countries. If both
expected and actual scores are jointly influenced by another cultural variable, then both
values should be homogenous within groups and no significant influence of expected
scores on actual scores should be observable within groups. If, however, expected
scores have an influence on actual scores that goes beyond the variation caused by the
country, this should also be observable within countries. Table 15 shows the results of
the corresponding regressions.
Table 15
Regression analysis for the compromise utility value per country (SCORE).
Country Statistic Intercept Expected
Score
(ESCORE)
Reservation
score
(RSCORE)
Expected
friendliness
(EFRNDLY)
AT Parameter 36.5736 0.34883 0.27677 -6.64050
t-value 2.42 2.06 2.26 -1.59
p > |t| 0.0242 0.0512 0.0339 0.1266
CH Parameter 19.5145 0.37851 0.04126 10.44009
t-value 1.03 1.79 0.32 2.73
p > |t| 0.3224 0.0984 0.7530 0.0181
EC Parameter 64.9616 0.10078 0.21521 0.44368
t-value 2.30 0.39 3.04 0.11
p > |t| 0.0402 0.7063 0.0102 0.9154
FI Parameter 45.0780 0.18500 -0.05404 3.64958
t-value 3.81 1.10 -0.43 1.30
p > |t| 0.0004 0.2775 0.6664 0.2011
The relationship between expected and actual scores remains significant for Austria and
Switzerland, but not for Ecuador and Finland. If we compare the four countries using
five dimensions listed in Table 1, we see that there is no dimension that can be used to
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differentiate the two pairs of countries (e.g., although individualism is high for both
Austria and Switzerland, it is also high for Finland and low for Ecuador). This may
suggest another dimension on which the two groups differ and which links expectations
and results for one group and has no effect for another.
At the negotiation dyad level, no significant influences of expectations on the outcome
variables were found.
5.2.4 Effects of expectations on the assessment (H7)
The results of the regression analysis for various assessment variables on the
negotiators’ expectations are given in Table 16. As postulated in hypothesis H7, an
influence of reservation scores on the assessment variables can be observed, which is
significant for two variables (and close to significant for the other two).
Table 16
Regression analysis for the assessment variables.
Dependent
Variable
Statistic Intercept Expected
score
(ESCORE)
Reservation
score
(RSCORE)
Expected
friendliness
(EFRNDLY)
Satisfaction Parameter 3.867975 -0.005326  -0.011608 0.008223
with agreement t-value  4.22 -0.54 -1.94  0.04
(AGRSAT) p > |t| 0.0001 0.5915 0.0552 0.9672
Control Parameter 3.222201 -0.003290 -0.0082861  0.221602
(CONTROL) t-value 4.50 -0.42 -1.74  1.44
p > |t|  0.0001   0.6742   0.0850   0.1527
Met Parameter  4.191485 -0.011802  -0.009555   0.172758
expectations t-value  4.53  -1.17  -1.55   0.87
(METE) p > |t|  0.0001   0.2443   0.1234   0.3863
Satisfied with Parameter  3.451353 -0.013699  -0.006753   0.351888
performance t-value  5.06  -1.84  -1.49   2.40
(PERF) p > |t| 0.0001  0.0684  0.1398  0.0182
In interpreting Table 16, it should be noted that high values in the dependent variables
indicate low levels of satisfaction. Thus high reservation levels increase both the
satisfaction with the agreement and the perceived level of control. Since the same
scaling was used for variable EFRNDLY, high levels of expected friendliness increase
satisfaction with performance. This last influence suggests that a positive attitude prior
to the negotiation has a positive impact on one’s satisfaction with his/her own
performance.
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5.3 Direct implications of atmosphere
5.3.1 Effects of the atmosphere on the results (H8)
The results of a regression of individual utility values on variables characterizing the
negotiation atmosphere are given in Table 17.
Table 17
Regression analysis for the compromise utility value (SCORE).
Independent Variable Parameter
estimate
t value P > |t|
Intercept 68.61223 9.77 0.0001
Opponent’s PSA -1.93384 -0.58 0.5634
Opponents Factor 2 -0.37642 -0.13 0.8945
Own PSA -1.10200 -0.35 0.7284
Own  Factor 2 -0.16488 -0.06 0.9538
See opponent (SEEOPP) -4.85582 -2.20 0.0323
Disclosed ID (DISCLID) -3.89786 -0.35 0.7305
Disclosed Country (DISCLC) 2.63348  0.22 0.8250
Work with opp. (WORKWOPP) 9.35614  1.62 0.1107
Contrary to our expectations, the problem solving atmosphere (PSA) did not have a
significant impact on the compromise utility values. The only variables that did have
some impact are willingness to see the opponent and to work with the opponent. Both
variables have similar effects, although, due to different scaling of variables, the
regression coefficients have different signs. Both willingness to see the opponent and
willingness to work with the opponent increase the compromise utility value. This result
is consistent with results reported by Rubin and Brown (1975).
If, however, we take into account individual components of problem solving attitude
rather than the aggregate construct, further relationships can be identified. This is
presented in Table 18.
There is a strong impact of both one’s own and perceived honesty of the opponent on
the utility value of the negotiated agreement. The directions of the influences are,
however, opposite. The negotiator’s perception of the opponent being an honest partner
increases his/her utility of the compromise (the significance level is 2.59%). However,
if a negotiator himself/herself is seen by the opponent as being honest then this has a
negative impact on the negotiator’s utility value (with the significance level of 9.25%).
The implication may be that honesty is considered a weakness on the part of the
negotiator but it is viewed as a competitive advantage if the opponent is honest.
Persuasiveness has also a significant impact on the negotiator’s utility value of the
compromise. However, in this case it is only the negotiator’s ability to be persuasive.
The perception of the opponent being persuasive does not have such an impact. A
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positive impact on the negotiator’s utility value of the achieved compromise (SCORE)
results from his/her willingness to work with the opponent in future.
We have found no significant differences for these four variables in the analysis
between the four countries. The two effects identified before remain significant,
however the significance is weak.
Table 18
Regression of scores on PSA components.
Independent Variable Parameter
estimate
t value p > |t|
Intercept 61.18158 2.29 0.0267
Cooperative 3.38091 1.10 0.2762
Exploitative 4.19121 0.99 0.3288
Opponent Honest -8.26277 -2.30 0.0259
Informative 1.42750 0.37 0.9599
Persuasive 1.27781 0.33 0.7108
Cooperative -1.39458 -0.43 0.6710
Exploitative 3.13231 0.75 0.4546
Negotiator Honest 6.02181 1.72 0.0925
Informative -1.87575 -0.68 0.4992
Persuasive -8.76915 -2.27 0.0279
Opponent friendly 4.35561 1.71 0.0935
See Opponent -3.49042 -0.56 0.5771
Negotiator Disclose ID -6.01970 -0.58 0.5621
Disclosed country 3.51880 0.30 0.7633
Work with opponent 11.08480 1.91 0.0619
The atmosphere under which a negotiation was conducted also had significant
influences on the results at the group level. Table 19 lists the results of probit analysis,
in which the probability of obtaining a Pareto-optimal compromise was regressed on the
variables describing the atmosphere. Parameter estimates given in Table 19 indicate the
likelihood of obtaining an inefficient outcome and high factor values indicate the
absence of problem solving attitude.
Problem solving attitude (PSA) positively influences the probability of achieving a
Pareto-optimal compromise. The influence is stronger if the negotiator has a high PSA
value than if their opponents have a high value.
In Table 19 five variables describing the opponent’s attractiveness are also included.
Only the willingness to work with the opponent has an impact on the compromise; it
increases the probability of achieving a compromise that is Pareto-optimal.
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Table 19
Probit analysis of Pareto efficient outcomes on PSA.
Independent variables Parameter
estimate
Chi Square Pr > Chi
Square
Intercept 0.62017  0.48758  0.4850
Opponent’s PSA 0.58757  3.72226  0.0537
Opponent‘s Factor 2 0.15450  3.72226  0.5829
Own PSA 0.77297  6.00608  0.0143
Own  Factor 2 0.22647  0.71649  0.3973
Opponent’s friendliness (FRNDLY) -0.07970  0.13445  0.7139
See opponent (SEEOPP)  0.10278  0.31462  0.5749
Disclosed ID (DISCLID) -0.05298  0.00320  0.9549
Disclosed country (DISCLC)  0.89098  0.71046  0.3993
Work with opponent (WORKWOPP) -1.09860  5.47732  0.0193
5.3.2 Effects of the atmosphere on the assessment (H9)
Tables 20-23 present the results of regression analysis of the variables that describe the
subjects assessment (satisfaction with the agreement, perceived control, meeting
expectations, and satisfactions with one’s own performance) on the variables describing
atmosphere.
Hypothesis H9 was formulated mainly with reference to PSA (as measured by the first
factor). We expected a friendlier atmosphere to increase satisfaction with the
negotiation process and its outcomes. This relationship is not reflected in the empirical
data. However, these results are in accordance with the interpretation of the second PSA
factor as "negotiator toughness".  Having a tough opponent significantly decreases
overall satisfaction with the agreement as well as performance.
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Table 20
Regression of atmosphere on satisfaction with the agreement (AGRSAT).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  2.652915582  5.14 0.0001
Opponent’s PSA  0.358570142  1.44 0.1554
Opponents Factor 2 -0.528216742 -2.64 0.0105
Own PSA  0.422045474  1.84 0.0711
Own  Factor 2 -0.047066368 -0.23 0.8160
See opponent  0.286128311  1.84 0.0707
Disclose ID  0.669603363  0.79 0.4321
Disclose country -0.178306561 -0.20 0.8421
Work with opponent -0.548877067 -1.33 0.1880
Table 21
Regression of atmosphere on perceived control (CONTROL).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  2.620732803 6.37 0.0001
Opponent’s PSA  0.246389251 1.20 0.2342
Opponents Factor 2 -0.123741912 -0.78 0.4408
Own PSA -0.017554911 -0.09 0.9263
Own  Factor 2 -0.276312174 -1.70 0.0933
See opponent  0.108690700 0.89 0.3754
Disclose ID -0.246472392 -0.34 0.7320
Disclose country  0.359584640 0.48 0.6348
Work with opponent  0.070257253 0.21 0.8344
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Table 22
Regression of atmosphere on MET EXPECTATIONS.
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  2.715489878   5.29 0.0001
Opponent’s PSA -0.029619800  -0.12 0.9083
Opponents Factor 2 -0.066753398  -0.34 0.7386
Own PSA -0.109430947  -0.46 0.6445
Own  Factor 2 -0.189278355  -0.94 0.3533
See opponent  0.384538225   2.53 0.0140
Disclose ID  0.023426019   0.03 0.9792
Disclose Country -0.121580138  -0.13 0.8976
Work with opponent -0.686461564  -1.64 0.1055
Table 23
Regression of atmosphere on satisfaction with performance (PERF).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  2.740439889  6.86  0.0001
Opponent’s PSA  0.190250976  0.95  0.3433
Opponents Factor 2 -0.281986169 -1.82  0.0736
Own PSA  0.000110291  0.00  0.9995
Own  Factor 2  0.044670596  0.28  0.7776
See opponent  0.027287767  0.23  0.8182
Disclose ID  0.456409897  0.66  0.5143
Desclose Country -0.537162868 -0.73  0.4656
Work with opponent -0.057151459 -0.18  0.8610
The relationship between one’s toughness (as perceived by the opponent) and perceived
control of the negotiation process is negative: negotiators who are perceived as tough,
do not feel themselves to be in control during the negotiation. The only other significant
relationship is the positive relationship between meeting the expectations and
willingness to see the opponent.
5.4 Direct implications of process
5.4.1 Effects of the process on the results (H10)
Effects of process variables on outcomes were found not significant.
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5.4.2 Effects of the process on assessment (H11)
According to hypothesis H11, there should be a positive relationship between
communication and satisfaction. The results of the regression analysis of process
variables on the satisfaction with the agreement are given in Table 24. We found that
while the influence of the number of offers accompanied by messages on aggregate
satisfaction is indeed positive, the total number of offers had the converse effect, and the
number of messages had no significant effect. The positive effect of offers with
messages can be explained by the fact that messages are verbal and in free format, while
offers have a rigid structure. Verbal messages that accompany offers thus seem
important in building a positive attitude towards the negotiations. This may be because
they provide justification for the offers while messages that not accompany offers may
be sent to remind or push the opponent. A large fraction of activities taking place during
the last day of negotiations decreases satisfaction significantly.
Table 24
Regression of process variables on satisfaction with agreement (AGRSAT*).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  6.43375791 0.76 0.4597
Number of offers  1.09996564 2.68 0.0153
Offers with messages -1.26802214 -2.94 0.0087
Number of messages -0.27550510 -0.81 0.4291
Duration of negotiation -0.00000023 -0.40 0.6964
Time between offers -0.00000108 -1.18 0.2540
Length of messages  0.00062025 0.69 0.5005
Activity during last day 47.34292147 2.41 0.0269
Activity during last 2 days -16.35483594 -1.29 0.2125
Activity during last 4 days  0.84905529 0.32 0.7559
Time difference between
agreement and deadline
-0.00091075 -0.20 0.8436
* 1=Extremely satisfied, 7=Extremely dissatisfied
An ambivalent picture emerges with respect to perceived control by negotiators
(CONTROL), see Table 25. According to H11, we expected a positive influence of
communication on control. But on the other hand, message length has a negative effect.
No significant effects of process variables were found on meeting a negotiator’s
expectations.
Similar results hold for satisfaction with performance presented in Table 26. While
barely significant (around the 11% level), the influence of the number of messages is
again negative. On the other hand, message frequency (the inverse of time between
messages) has a positive effect.
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Table 25
Regression of process on perceived control (CONTROL).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept  4.62047361  0.83 0.4190
Number of offers -0.07534542 -0.28 0.7829
Offers with messages -0.24354509 -0.86 0.4005
Number of messages -0.46446940 -2.08 0.0522
Duration of negotiation  0.00000004  0.11 0.9144
Time between offers -0.00000093 -1.55 0.1386
Length of messages  0.00116281  1.96 0.0651
Activity during last day -3.09508613 -0.24 0.8130
Activity during last 2 days 12.26568812  1.48 0.1567
Activity during last 4 days  1.54933944  0.88 0.3914
Time difference between
agreement and deadline
-0.00380662 -1.28 0.2185
* 1=Very much in control, 7=Not in control
Table 26
Regression of process on satisfaction with performance (PERF *)
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p>|t|
Intercept   2.11156745  0.27 0.7882
Number of offers  -0.56363953 -1.51 0.1485
Offers with messages   0.08513560  0.22 0.8305
Number of messages  -0.52771580 -1.70 0.1055
Duration of negotiation   0.00000030  0.57 0.5737
Time between offers  -0.00000248 -2.98 0.0080
Length of messages   0.00083072  1.01 0.3246
Activity during last day  -6.76726976 -0.38 0.7093
Activity during last 2 days  12.25991158  1.07 0.3006
Activity during last 4 days   4.29576127  1.76 0.0959
Time difference between
agreement and deadline
 -0.00001776 -0.00 0.9966
* 1=Completely,  7= Not at all
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5.5 Direct implications of results
Our last hypothesis (H12) refers to the impact of the direct results of negotiations, that is
the agreement and its characteristics on the negotiators’ assessment of the process and
their performance. Results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 27-30.
Table 27
Regression of result variables on satisfaction with agreement (AGGRSAT).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p >|t|
Intercept    4.933463  6.77 0.0001
Agreement’s utility (SCORE)   -0.029625 -3.77 0.0003
SCORE relative to expectations   -0.305490 -0.69 0.4941
Pareto agreement   -0.474179 -1.70 0.0927
Agreement reached    0.370256  0.80 0.4236
1=Extremely satisfied, 7=Extremely dissatisfied
Table 28
Regression of result variables on perceived control (CONTROL).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p >|t|
Intercept 3.649675067 5.63 0.0001
Agreement’s utility (SCORE) -0.019004 -2.72 0.0082
SCORE relative to expectations 0.2346411 0.59 0.5548
Pareto agreement 0.0193151 0.08 0.9381
Agreement reached 0.2569035 0.63 0.5323
1=Very much in control, 7=Not in control
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Table 29
Regression of result variables on meeting expectation (METE*).
Independent variable Parameter
estimate
t value p >|t|
Intercept 3.707607670  4.53 0.0001
Agreement’s utility (SCORE) -0.025979895 -2.94 0.0043
SCORE relative to expectations 0.084913716  0.17 0.8654
Pareto agreement 0.028849039  0.09 0.9268
Agreement reached 0.815908473  1.58 0.1186
* 1= Completely, 7=Not at all
Table 30
Regression of result variables on satisfaction with performance (PERF*).
Parameter
estimate
t value p >|T
Intercept  3.342871  4.55  0.0001
Agreement’s utility (SCORE) -0.023549 -2.97  0.0040
SCORE relative to expectations  0.600739  1.34  0.1840
Pareto agreement  0.118853  0.42  0.6733
Agreement reached  0.391276  0.84  0.4016
* 1= Completely, 7=Not at all
Hypothesis H12 specified a general relationship between outcome and assessment. This
is confirmed by the empirical results. As could be expected, the effect of the utility
values of the achieved agreements on assessment is positive.
5.6 Summary of hypotheses
The following table summarizes the twelve hypotheses formulated in Section 4 and
presents the results that were obtained.
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Table 31
Summary of hypotheses and results.
Hypothesis Dependent
variable(s)
Independent
variable(s)
Results
H1 Expectations Culture confirmed, significant influence on expected score and
expected friendliness of negotiations
H2 Atmosphere Culture not confirmed with respect to problem solving atmosphere,
confirmed with respect to negotiator attractiveness
H3 Process Culture confirmed, significant differences in the number of offers
accompanied by messages and message length.
H4 Atmosphere Expectations not confirmed
H5 Process Expectations confirmed, higher expectations increase communication,
higher reservation reduces communication
H6 Outcomes Expectations confirmed, strong positive influence of expectations on
actual score
H7 Assessment Expectations confirmed, significant positive influence of reservation score
on assessment
H8 Outcomes Atmosphere not confirmed, with respect to problem solving attitude,
partially confirmed for negotiator attractiveness and some
PSA components
H9 Assessment Atmosphere confirmed, willingness to see opponent has positive
influence on assessment
H10 Outcomes Process not confirmed
H11 Assessment Process confirmed, but no clear pattern
H12 Assessment Outcomes confirmed, significant positive influence of score on
assessment
6. Conclusions and future research
6.1 Images of cultures
The main aim of our research is to study the effects of cultural traits in anonymous
negotiations carried out via a technical medium. We can use our findings to compose a
comprehensive picture as to how negotiators originating from different cultures behave
during negotiations. To form this image we go beyond the framework proposed in
Figure 1 and also discuss differences in outcomes and assessments, which according to
our framework are only indirect effects of culture.
Negotiators from Austria entered the negotiation with a rather pessimistic attitude with
respect to the results and with respect to friendliness (see Table 5). In contrast to their
expectations, Austrians perceived their negotiation partners as friendlier than others,
while they were perceived as less friendly themselves as indicated in Figure 4. While
communication behavior depends on the composition of the negotiating dyad, Austrians
also take an extreme position in sending the least number of offers accompanied by
messages (see Table 10).
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Figure 4. Boxplot of perceived friendliness of negotiators
The low expectations of the Austrians with respect to results are confirmed by the actual
outcomes, as indicated in Figure 5. They have also obtained significantly lower scores
than negotiators from other countries. Consequently, they were least satisfied with their
performance (see Figure 6).
Figure 5. Box plot for scores.
In many ways negotiators from Ecuador were exactly the opposite of Austrians. They
expected (and achieved) the highest outcomes, and were most optimistic in their
expectations about the friendliness of negotiations. Their expectations of friendly
negotiations were not fulfilled, they perceived their negotiation partners as not so
friendly and were also perceived as least friendly themselves. Another specific trait is
the significantly higher amount of communication, as indicated in Table 10. They had
the best performance and were also most satisfied with their performance in the
negotiations.
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Figure 6. Boxplots of satisfaction with performance
Finland and Switzerland are rather close in most of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions,
except in masculinity. This closeness is also reflected in our data, where negotiators
from those two countries often have strikingly similar values. Their expectations
concerning results were somewhat higher than those of the Austrians, but much lower
than those of the Ecuadorians, while expectations concerning friendliness were similar
to those of the Austrians. Negotiators from Finland and Switzerland were perceived
friendlier than participants from Austria and Ecuador, but they did not differ from others
in their own perceptions. Their communication behavior is also similar to each other
and between the two other countries. Their results are also in between the high
achievements of the Ecuadorians and the low ones of the Austrians, but they are quite
satisfied with their performance.
6.2 Evaluation of the conceptual model
The summary of the results is depicted in Figure 7 in which the influences that were not
analyzed are also indicated.
 Significant influence
 Inconclusive results
 No influence found
 Not analyzed
Results
Assessment of
process, results,
opponent, oneself
Situational
constraints
Culture and other
characteristics
Process
Atmosphere
Expectations
Figure 7. Summary of results
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Our results indicate that significant direct influences of culture exist on a negotiator’s
expectations and the negotiation process, especially on the communication patterns of
negotiators. These results confirm our hypotheses that negotiators’ expectations (H1)
and the negotiation process (H3) are culture dependent. Via expectations, culture also
has a significant influence on the process and its results, confirming our hypotheses that
the expectations (H5) and assessment of the process (H7) depend on culture. These
results are indicated in Figure7 by a double line.
The strong chain of relationships is not continued in the right-hand side of Figure7. The
negative results concerning the relationship between the atmosphere under which the
negotiation is conducted and results (hypothesis H8) add to the already conflicting
evidence found in the literature. Although the theoretical arguments for a relationship
between negotiation process and outcomes are rather convincing, hypothesis H10 that
postulated this influence, is not supported.
A similarly ambivalent pattern emerges with respect to a negotiator's assessment. A
problem solving attitude failed to play a significant role, while the second factor, which
we labeled "negotiator toughness" and which was not earlier studied, was identified as a
significant influence.  On the other hand, the relationship between results and
assessment is plausible.
One can think of several explanations for these results. One possibility is that there
simply is no such relationship. Under this framework, culture has an impact just on
expectations and process variables. However, none of them has sufficient influence on
the negotiation results and assessment, so the initial influence of culture is diluted.
However, this hypothesis must be rejected in view of the fact that significant differences
in results of negotiations do exist for negotiators from different countries as shown in
Figure 5 above.
The differences between the average utilities and the 75% intervals are clearly visible.
The utilities achieved by Ecuadorians are significantly higher than those achieved by
negotiators from Austria and Finland. According to the model proposed in this paper,
the relationship between culture and the results is indirect. If these differences caused
the differences in negotiation behavior identified in the previous sections, then those
behavioral differences must also be related to outcomes. One possible explanation is
that significant process variables were not taken into account; we plan to address this
issue when additional variables are available.
6.3 Conclusions
In earlier discussions on Web-based cross-cultural negotiations the following
reservations were formulated.
1. We study the effects of culture after the obvious sensory cultural cues are removed.
One line of reservation is that after these cues are removed, the study of what is “left
over” makes little sense.
2. Communication is central to negotiations. Therefore, studying negotiations with the
use of a narrow communication channel is rather vacuous.
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3. The rationale for our study includes our belief about increasing the role of the Web
for the conduct of negotiations. However, it has been stated that there is little
evidence that Web-based negotiations are going to become a frequent form of
negotiation, except perhaps for very simple transactions.
On the surface culture exhibits itself with visible behavioral patterns just like a physical
distance people try to keep, their facial expressions, manners, etc. These and obvious
other artifacts are present at the surface level and are seen, heard and possibly sensed
but they are the result of cultural traits present at the level of values, norms, traditions,
rituals and so on. The literature on cross-cultural negotiations concentrates on studying
more complex cultural constructs than the superficial ones. They include problem
solving attitude, attractiveness, development of relationship, competitiveness.
Face-to-face negotiations introduce bias because the subjects may modify their behavior
and attitudes according to their perceptions of the counterparts’ culture. Anonymous
negotiations remove this bias. In fact and contrary to the first criticism, their effect may
be that the subjects have to base their strategies and tactics on culture even stronger than
in the face-to-face negotiations. The fact that there is less information available
(especially implicit information about cultural norms and values of the other) causes
higher social uncertainty which ties behavior even stronger to own cultural scripts for
such situations.  We know of no comparative studies regarding this issue. A simple
experiment that we plan to conduct is the comparison of the expected compromise,
BATNA and reservation levels when the negotiators know their negotiation partners
prior to the negotiation and when they must establish these values without prior
knowledge of their counterparts.
Web-based anonymous negotiations allow study issues that could not be studied before
and in settings previously not possible. This includes a case that is more realistic, a
negotiation pace controlled by the subjects, and the subjects’ ability to prepare for
negotiations and analysis and submissions of offers and messages. The current
limitation of the INSPIRE system is the narrow communication channel; the subjects
can communicate only via structured offers and unstructured written messages. Our
experiences indicate that this limitation allows for fairly expressive communication and
exchange of information.
INSPIRE users, especially those from non-English countries, find positive aspects to
this mode of communication because it allows them to analyze offers and messages and
reply to them without pressures present in face-to-face communication. Also, a number
of users established two-layered communication. They exchanged offers and messages
pertaining to negotiations and separate messages about themselves, their interests, etc.
Several reports written by the INSPIRE users are available on the Web at
http://interneg.org/interneg/training/inspire/reports/. An example of the content rich and two-
layered communication can be found in the report by Margarita Nikitina from Russia
who negotiated with a counterpart from Canada.
Some scientists may dispute the increasing role of the Web in communications between
people and organizations. While most of the Web-based commerce, business-to-
business transactions take place in North America, there is no reason to assume that the
use of Web technologies will not reach other countries to an extent much greater than
today. The use of these technologies includes virtual collaboration, cooperation between
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organizations, commerce negotiations and decision making. Virtual markets have
already been established in which people engage in negotiations.
All these developments take place not only on a national, but also on a global scale.
Cross-cultural negotiations via the Internet will therefore, in our view, become a regular
phenomenon in the near future and aspects of culture in such negotiations therefore
need to be taken into account. While this provides a motivation for our study, the
primary one was to study the impact of culture and different constructs in a situation
when the obvious visible cultural artifacts are removed. Overt behavior alone cannot be
used to decipher culture because it manifests itself at the levels of deep tacit
assumptions, espoused values and day to day behavior. This behavior represents a
compromise between the values and assumption and the requirements of the situation at
hand.
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